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"Franse overheid voert phishingtest uit op 2,5 miljoen leerlingen"
security.nl/posting/881630/Fra

KRANKZINNIG!

Het is meestal onmogelijk om nepberichten (e-mail, SMS, ChatApp, social media en papieren post - zie plaatje) betrouwbaar van echte te kunnen onderscheiden.

Tegen phishing en vooral nepwebsites is echter prima iets te doen, zoals ik vandaag nogmaals beschreef in security.nl/posting/881655.

(Big Tech en luie websitebeheerders willen dat niet, dus is en blijft het een enorm gevecht).

#Phishing#NepWebsites#DV
Antwortete im Thread

@mensrea : if you visit a shop (or a bank) in the center of the city, chances are near zero that it's run by impostors.

However, if you go to some vague second hand market, chances are the you will be deceived.

Possibly worse, if there's an ATM on the outside wall of a shack where Hells Angels meet, would you insert your bank card and enter your PIN?

On the web, most people do not know WHERE they are.

Big Tech is DELIBERATELY withholding essential information from people, required to determine the amount of trust that a website deserves.

DELIBERATELY, because big tech can rent much more (cheap) hosting and (meaningless) domain names to whomever if website vistors cannot distinguish between authentic and fake websites.

You are right that some people will never understand why they need to know who owns a website.

However, most people (including @troyhunt ) would enormously benefit.

Like all the other deaf and blind trolls, you trash a proposal because it may be useless for SOME, you provide zero solutions and you keep bashing me.

What part of "get lost" do you not understand?

@aral @EUCommission @letsencrypt @nlnet

Antwortete im Thread
Screenshot from the top of https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/13.248.197.209/relations

The page had already redreshed when I copied the following domain names, so this is just to get an idea:

tiles-35312.bond
sleepwear-14660.bond
prostate-cancer-treatment-95682.bond
diet-98948.bond
electric-cars-94009.bond
packing-jobs-44721.bond
dental-implants-48408.bond
mattress-19892.bond
breast-reduction-mammoplasty-surgery-24489.bond
dental-implants-76071.bond
rv-camper-motorhomes-90728.bond
roofing-services-61345.bond
maid-service-26172.bond
Infosec ExchangeErik van Straten (@ErikvanStraten@infosec.exchange)Angehängt: 1 Bild @aral@mastodon.ar.al : most Let's Encrypt (and other Domain Validated) certificates are issued to junk- or plain criminal websites. They're the ultimate manifestation of evil big tech. They were introduced to encrypt the "last mile" because Internet Service Providers were replacing ads in webpages and, in the other direction, inserting fake clicks. DV has destroyed the internet. People loose their ebank savings and companies get ransomwared; phishing is dead simple. EDIW/EUDIW will become an identity fraud disaster (because of AitM phishing atracks). Even the name "Let's Encrypt" is wrong for a CSP: nobody needs a certificate to encrypt a connection. The primary purpose of a certificate is AUTHENTICATION (of the owner of the private key, in this case the website). However, for human beings, just a domain name simply does not provide reliable identification information. It renders impersonation a peace of cake. Decent online authentication is HARD. Get used to it instead of denying it. REASONS/EXAMPLES 🔹 Troy Hunt fell in the DV trap: https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/114222237036021070 🔹 Google (and Troy Hunt!) killed non-DV certs (for profit) because of the stripe.com PoC. Now Chrome does not give you any more info than what Google argumented: https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/114224682101772569 🔹 https:⧸⧸cancel-google.com/captcha was live yesterday: https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/114224264440704546 🔹 Stop phishing proposal: https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/113079966331873386 🔹 Lots of reasons why LE sucks: https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/112914047006977222 (corrected link 09:20 UTC) 🔹 This website stopped registering junk .bond domain names, probably because there were too many every day (the last page I found): https://newly-registered-domains.abtdomain.com/2024-08-15-bond-newly-registered-domains-part-1/. However, this gang is still active, open the RELATIONS tab in https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/13.248.197.209/relations. You have to multiply the number of LE certs by approx. 5 because they also register subdomains and don't use wildcard certs. Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revolver-rabbit-gang-registers-500-000-domains-for-malware-campaigns/ @EUCommission@ec.social-network.europa.eu @letsencrypt @nlnet@nlnet.nl #Authentication #Impersonation #Spoofing #Phishing #DV #GoogleIsEvil #BigTechIsEvil #Certificates #httpsVShttp #AitM #MitM #FakeWebsites #CloudflareIsEvil #bond #dotBond #Spam #Infosec #Ransomware #Banks #CloudflareIsEvil #FakeWebsites
Antwortete im Thread

@aral : most Let's Encrypt (and other Domain Validated) certificates are issued to junk- or plain criminal websites.

They're the ultimate manifestation of evil big tech.

They were introduced to encrypt the "last mile" because Internet Service Providers were replacing ads in webpages and, in the other direction, inserting fake clicks.

DV has destroyed the internet. People loose their ebank savings and companies get ransomwared; phishing is dead simple. EDIW/EUDIW will become an identity fraud disaster (because of AitM phishing atracks).

Even the name "Let's Encrypt" is wrong for a CSP: nobody needs a certificate to encrypt a connection. The primary purpose of a certificate is AUTHENTICATION (of the owner of the private key, in this case the website).

However, for human beings, just a domain name simply does not provide reliable identification information. It renders impersonation a peace of cake.

Decent online authentication is HARD. Get used to it instead of denying it.

REASONS/EXAMPLES

🔹 Troy Hunt fell in the DV trap: infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat

🔹 Google (and Troy Hunt!) killed non-DV certs (for profit) because of the stripe.com PoC. Now Chrome does not give you any more info than what Google argumented: infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat

🔹 https:⧸⧸cancel-google.com/captcha was live yesterday: infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat

🔹 Stop phishing proposal: infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat

🔹 Lots of reasons why LE sucks:
infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat (corrected link 09:20 UTC)

🔹 This website stopped registering junk .bond domain names, probably because there were too many every day (the last page I found): newly-registered-domains.abtdo. However, this gang is still active, open the RELATIONS tab in virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/. You have to multiply the number of LE certs by approx. 5 because they also register subdomains and don't use wildcard certs. Source: bleepingcomputer.com/news/secu

@EUCommission @letsencrypt @nlnet

Antwortete im Thread

@BjornW :

I've stopped doing that after a lot of people called me an idiot and a liar if I kindly notified them. I stopped, I'll get scolded anyway.

Big tech and most admins want everyone to believe that "Let's Encrypt" is the only goal. Nearly 100% of tech people believe that.

And admins WANT to believe that, because reliable authentication of website owners is a PITA. They just love ACME and tell their website visitors to GFY.

People like you tooting nonsense get a lot of boosts. It's called fake news or big tech propaganda. If you know better, why don't you WRITE BETTER?

It has ruined the internet. Not for phun but purely for profit. And it is what ruins people's lives and lets employees open the vdoor for ransomware and data-theft.

See also infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat (and, in Dutch, security.nl/posting/881296).

@troyhunt @letsencrypt

Infosec ExchangeErik van Straten (@ErikvanStraten@infosec.exchange)🌘DV-CERT MIS-ISSUANCES & OCSP ENDING🌒 🧵#1/3 On Jul 23, 2024, Josh Aas of Let's Encrypt wrote, while his nose was growing rapidly: <<< Intent to End OCSP Service [...] We plan to end support for OCSP primarily because it represents a considerable risk to privacy on the Internet. [...] CRLs do not have this issue. >>> https://letsencrypt.org/2024/07/23/replacing-ocsp-with-crls.html 🚨 On THAT SAME DAY, Jul 23, 2024, LE (Let's Encrypt) issued at least 34 certs (certificates) for [*.]dydx.exchange to cybercriminals, of which LE revoked 27 mis-issued certs approximately 6.5 hours later. Note that falsified DNS records may instruct DNS caching servers to retain entries for a long time; therefore speedy revocation helps reducing the number of victims. Apart from this mis-issuance *blunder*, CRL's have HUGE issues that Josh does not mention: they are SSSLLLOOOWWW and files are potentially huge - while OCSP is instantaneous and uses little bandwith. 🌘NO OCSP INCREASES INTERNET RISKS🌒 If LE quits OCSP support, the average risk of using the internet will *increase*. 🌘LIES🌒 Furthermore, the privacy argument is mostly moot, as nearly every website makes people's browsers connect to domains owned by Google (and even let's those browsers execute Javascript from third party servers, allowing nearly unlimited espionage). In addition, IP-addresses are sent in the plain anyway (📎). (📎 When using a VPN, source and destination IP-addresses *within the tunnel* are not visible for anyone with access to the *outside* of the tunnel - but they are sent in the plain between the end of the tunnel and the actual server.) Worse, the remote endpoint of your E2EE https connection increasingly often is *not* the actual server (that website was moved to sombody else's server in the cloud anyway), but a CDN proxy server which has the ability to monitor everything you do (unencrypting your data: three letter agencies love it, FISA section 702 grants them unlimmited access - without anyone informing you). 🤷 LE may try to blame others for their mis-issuance blunder, but *THEY* chose to use old, notoriously untrustworthy, internet protocols (BGP and DNS, including database records - that DNSSEC will never protect) as the basis for authentication. By making that choice, LE and other DV cert suppliers were simply ASKING for trouble. 🔓 In fact, the promise that Let's Encrypt would make the internet safer was misleading from the start: domain names are mostly meaningless to users, 100% fault intolerant, unpredictable and easily forgotten. If your browser is communicating with a malicious server, encryption is pointless. Josh, stop lying to us; your motives are purely economical. 🌘CORRUPT: BIG TECH FACILITATES CRIME🌒 DV-certs were heavily promoted by Google (not for phun but for profit) after their researchers "proved" that it was possible to show misleasing identification information in the browser's address bar after certificate mis-issuance (the "Stripe, Inc" incident, https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/12/nope-this-isnt-the-https-validated-stripe-website-you-think-it-is/). This message was repeated by many specialists (e.g. https://www.troyhunt.com/paypals-beautiful-demonstration-of-extended-validation-fud/) with stupid arguments: certificates do NOT directly warrant reliable websites. OV and EV certificates, and QWAC's, more or less reliably, warrant *WHO OWNS* a domain name. That means that users know *who* they're doing business with, can depend on their reputation and can sue them if they violate laws. "Of course" Google recently lost trust in Entrust for mis-issuing certificates (https://security.googleblog.com/2024/06/sustaining-digital-certificate-security.html). Meanwhile the internet has become a corrupt and criminal mess; its users get to see misleading identification info in their browser's address bar WAY MORE OFTEN, e.g. https:⁄⁄us–usps–ny.com (for loads of examples see https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.114.96.0/relations; tap ••• a couple of times). Supporting DN's like "ing–movil.com" and "m–santander.de" *is* facilitating cybercrime, by repeatedly mis-issuing certs for them (see https://crt.sh/?q=ing-movil.com and https://crt.sh/?q=m-santander.de) and by letting them hide behind a CDN (see https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/ing-movil.com/details and https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/m-santander.de/details). In addition, *thousands* of DV-certs have been mis-issued - without *their* issuers getting distrusted by Google, Microsoft, Apple and Mozilla. People have their bank accounts drained and companies get slammed with ransomware because of this. But no Big Tech company (including the likes of Cloudflare) takes ANY responsibility; they make Big Money by facilitating cybercrime. Not by issuing "free" DV-certs, but by selling domain names, server space and CDN functionality, and by letting browsers no longer distinguish between useful and useless certs. They've deliberately made the internet insecure *FOR PROFIT*. 🌘CERT MIS-ISSUANCE ROOT CAUSE🌒 The mis-issuance of LE certs was caused by the unauthorized modification of customer DNS records managed by SquareSpace; this incident was further described in https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/defi-exchange-dydx-v3-website-hacked-in-dns-hijack-attack/. Note that a similar attack, also affecting SquareSpace customers, occurred on July 11, 2024 (see https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dns-hijacks-target-crypto-platforms-registered-with-squarespace/). Even if it *looks like* that no certs were mis-issued during the July 11 incident, because (AFAIK) none of them have been revoked, this does not warrant that none of them were mis-issued; such certs can still be abused by attackers, albeit on a smaller scale. 🌘MORE INFO🌒 Please find additional information in two followups of this toot: 🧵#2/3 Extensive details regarding Mis-issued dydx.exchange certs on 2024-07-23; 🧵#3/3 Links to descriptions of multiple other DV-cert mis-issuance issues. 🌘DISCLAIMER🌒 I am not (and have never been) associated with any certificate supplier. My goal is to obtain a safer internet, in particular for users who are not forensic experts. It is *way* too hard for ordinary internet users to destinguish between 'fake' and 'authentic' on the internet. Something that, IMO, can an must significantly improve ASAP. Edited 08:16 UTC to add people: @troyhunt @dangoodin @BleepingComputer @agl #DV #LE #LetsEncrypt #Certificates #Certs #Misissuance #Mis_issuance #Revocation #Revoked #Weaknessess #WeakCertificates #WeakAuthentication #Authentication #Impersonation #Identification #Infosec #DNS #DNSHijacks #SquareSpace #Authorization #UnauthorizedChanges #UnauthorizedModifications #DeFi #dydx_exchange #CryptoCoins
Antwortete im Thread

@troyhunt : if we open a website that we've never visited before, we need browsers to show us all available details about that website, and warn us if such details are not available.

We also need better (readable) certificates identifying the responsible / accountable party for a website.

We have been lied to that anonymous DV certificates are a good idea *also* for websites we need to trust. It's a hoax.

Important: certificates never directly warrant the trustworthyness of a website. They're about authenticity, which includes knowing who the owner is and in which country they are located. This helps ensuring that you can sue them (or not, if in e.g. Russia) which *indirectly* makes better identifiable websites more reliable.

More info in infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat (see also crt.sh/?Identity=mailchimp-sso).

Note: most people do not understand certificates, like @BjornW in mastodon.social/@BjornW/114064:

@letsencrypt offers certificates to encrypt the traffic between a website & your browser.

2x wrong.

A TLS v1.3 connection is encrypted before the website sends their certificate, which is used only for *authentication* of the website (using a digital signature over unguessable secret TLS connection parameters). A cert binds the domain name to a public key, and the website proves possession of the associated private key.

However, for people a domain name simply does not suffice for reliable identification. People need more info in the certificate and it should be shown to them when it changes.

Will you please help me get this topic seriously on the public agenda?

Edited 09:15 UTC to add: tap "Alt" in the images for details.

Antwortete im Thread

@Linux : you're definitely not fearmongering.

Eugene Kaspersky warned many times for fragmentation of the internet, like in smh.com.au/technology/cyber-sp more than 11 years ago:

Mr Kaspersky said he feared governments would withdraw to their own parallel networks away from the prying eyes of others, and would cease investing in the development of the public internet, products and services.

(An IMO nice read on internet history: eugene.kaspersky.com/2017/02/0).

Personally I predicted many years ago that online identity fraud would cause too much damage soon.

Fortunately both predictions have not fully materialized, but we're definitely heading in the wrong direction.

Here's one example from many, severly undermining trust in the internet: bleepingcomputer.com/news/secu.

It's not just TLD's: by far most digital certificates are issued by Big Tech with pompous names like "Google Trust Services" - most of them to criminal websites.

See also gist.githubusercontent.com/qbo (src: @_r_netsec in infosec.exchange/@_r_netsec/11).

The Sydney Morning Herald · Cyber spying risks the future of the internet: Eugene KasperskyVon Lia Timson
Antwortete im Thread

@0xF21D : Cloudflare is evil anyway.

Cloudflare reverse-proxies (or -proxied):

-
cloudflare.com.save-israel·org
-
ns.cloudflare.com.save-israel·org
-
albert.ns.cloudflare.com.save-israel·org
-
sydney.ns.cloudflare.com.save-israel·org
-

I don't know whether any of these domains were or are malicious, but such domain names are insane; expect evilness.

See also:
crt.sh/?Identity=save-israel.o

Tap "Alt" in the images for more info.

@malanalysis

Antwortete im Thread

@0xF21D wrote: "[...] something we technically knew was going on before but didn't consciously consider a threat, until now."

I've been warning for CDN's like Cloudflare and Fastly (and cloud providers in general) for a long time.

Here's a recent toot (in Dutch, the "translate" button should do the job): infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat.

If you trust Google to translate it (guaranteed NOT error-free, it *may* work in other browsers than Chrome): infosec-exchange.translate.goo

P.S. Fastly knows your infosec.exchange login credentials.

@malanalysis

Screenshot van https://bleepingcomputer.com - allesbehalve authentiek (iets dat https zou moeten garanderen).

Want deze pagina is gegenereerd door een MitM, een server van Cloudflare. Er valt in te lezen dat:

• Mijn browser prima werkt

• Cloudflare okay is

• De door mij bedoelde website, die écht "bleepingcomputer.com" heet, op dat moment onbereikbaar was vanaf de Cloudflare server.

Dit bewijst dat ik géén E2EE verbinding had en heb met https://bleepingcomputer.com (een ICT security website). Als ik zou inloggen op die site, kan een beheerder bij Cloudflare mogelijk mijn user-ID en wachtwoord (onversleuteld!) "voorbij zien komen" en dergelijke gegevens desgewenst doorverkopen.

Naast dat de "Three-letter-agencies" ongetwijfeld alles wat voorbij komt op sleutelwoorden zullen scannen.

Internet is nooit privé...
Infosec ExchangeErik van Straten (@ErikvanStraten@infosec.exchange)Angehängt: 1 Bild Risico Cloudflare (+Trump) 🌦️ Achter Cloudflare Steeds meer websites zitten "achter" het Amerikaanse bedrijf Cloudflare. Stel u opent https://pvv.nl (let op, daar staat https:// vóór, Mastodon verstopt dat) in uw browser: browser <-1-> Cloudflare <-2-> https://pvv.nl ⛓️‍💥 Géén E2EE Bij zeer veel websites (https://pvv.nl is een voorbeeld) is er sprake van twee *verschillende* verbindingen, dus beslist geen E2EE = End-to-End-Encryption (voor zover dat überhaupt nog wat zegt als de "echte" een cloud-server van Google, Microsoft of Amazon is). 🕋 CDN's Cloudflare, een CDN (Content Delivery Network), heeft een wereldomspannend netwerk met "tunnel"-servers in computercentra van de meeste internetproviders. Waarschijnlijk ook bij u "om de hoek". 🔥 DDoS-aanvallen Dat is werkt uitstekend tegen DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) aanvallen. Ook zorgen CDN's voor veel snellere communicatie (mede doordat plaatjes e.d. op een web van servers "gecached" worden) - ook als de "echte" server aan de andere kant van de wereld staan. 🚨 Nadelen Maar dit is NIET zonder prijs! Cloudflare kan namelijk *meekijken* in zeer veel "versleuteld" netwerkverkeer (en dat zelfs, desgewenst, wijzigen). 🚦 Nee, niet *u* Ook kunnen Cloudflare-klanten allerlei regels instellen waar bezoekers aan moeten voldoen, en hen als "ongewenst" bezoek blokkeren (ook *criminele* klanten maken veelvuldig gebruik van deze mogelijkheid, o.a. om te voorkómen dat de makers van virusscanners nepwebsites op kwaadaardige inhoud kunnen checken). Aanvulling 14:39: { zo kan ik, met Firefox Focus onder Android, https://cidi.nl *niet* openen, ik zie dan een pagina waarin o.a. staat "Even geduld, de website van Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israël (CIDI) is aan het verifiëren of de verbinding veilig is. Please unblock challenges.cloudflare.com to proceed." } 😎 Men In Black Omdat Cloudflare een (tevens) in de VS gevestigd bedrijf is, moeten zij voldoen aan de Amerikaanse FISA section 702 wetgeving. Dat betekent dat hen opgedragen kan worden om internetverkeer te monitoren, en zij daar een zwijgplicht over hebben. Terwijl Amerikanen al minder privacy-rechten hebben dan Europeanen, hebben *niet*-Amerikanen *nul* privacyrechten volgens genoemde FISA wet. 🔓 Knip Dat https-verbindingen via Cloudflare niet E2EE zijn, blijkt uit onderstaand plaatje (dat vast méér mensen wel eens gezien hebben). 📜 Certificaten en foutmeldingen Dat plaatje kan, zonder certificaatfoutmeldingen, ALLEEN bestaan als Cloudflare een geldig authenticerend website-certificaat (een soort paspoort) heeft voor, in dit geval, https://bleepingcomputer.com - en dat hébben ze. Voor MILJOENEN websites. 🛃 MitM Cloudflare (maar ook anderen, zoals Fastly) zijn een MitM (Man in the Middle). 🤔 De tweede verbinding? Uw browser heeft, grotendeels transparant, een E2EE-verbinding met een Cloudflare server. U heeft géén idee wat voor soort verbinding Cloudflare met de werkelijke website heeft (is dat überhaupt https, en een veilige variant daarvan? Wat doet Cloudflare als het certificaat van de website verlopen is? Etc). 👽 AitM En zodra een MitM kwaadaardig wordt, noemen we het een AitM (A van Attacker of Adversary). 🗽 Trump Als Trump Cloudflare opdraagt om geen diensten meer aan NL of EU te leveren, werkt hier HELEMAAL NIETS MEER en dondert onze economie als een kaartenhuis in elkaar. 🃏 DV-certs Dat Cloudflare een website-certificaat voor bijvoorbeeld https://vvd.nl of https://cidi.nl heeft verkregen, zou vreemd moeten zijn. Dit is echter een peuleschil "dankzij" DV (Domain Validated) certificaten (het lievelingetje van Google) die het internet steeds onveiliger maken en waar ook onze overheid "voor gevallen is" (zie https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/114032329847123742). 😱 Nepwebsites Maar dit is nog niet alles: steeds meer criminele nepwebsites *verstoppen* zich achter Cloudflare, waar zijzelf (crimineel) geld aan verdient. Zie bijvoorbeeld https://security.nl/posting/876655 (of kijk eens in het "RELATIONS" tabblad van https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.114.96.0/relations en druk enkele keren op •••). #Risico #Economie #Cloudflare #Fastly #CDN #AitM #MitM #FISASection702 #FISA #ThreeLetterAgencies #Trump #Sbowden #E2EE #InfoSec #VVD #PVV #CIDI #VT #VirusTotal #DVCerts #DV #OV #EV #QWAC #CyberCrime #NepWebsites #FakeWebsites
#Cloudflare#MitM#AitM

arcanechat.me server reached 1500 users!!!

the server is using around 1GB of RAM, CPU is almost unused, and only 1.4GB of storage used for encrypted user volatile data, that is around 1MB per user on average!

the cost of self-hosting a #chatmail server for #ArcaneChat / #DeltaChat is really low! and you don't even need to trust the server operator or even the VPS provider if you are selfhosting since all is #e2ee and safe against #mitm thanks to the green checkmark in chats

arcanechat.meArcaneChatPrivate chats for the family
Fortgeführter Thread

@torproject same with #obfs4 bridges: there is no option to say like ports=80,443 or similar, which makes it cumbersome to get said bridges.

And trying to get places to #DontBlockTor that criminalize the use of #Tor is foolish at best.

#germany#hosters#tos
Antwortete im Thread

@SandraDeHaan schreef: "Ook NL heeft zich afhankelijk gemaakt van Amerikaanse digitale infrastructuur (o.a. cloud-diensten)."

Daar waarschuw ik al langer voor (zie security.nl/posting/684958 van 6-1-2021 toen ik de bestorming van het Capitool zag, en zie bovenaan die pagina).

En gisteren nog: infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat

En de NL overheid gaat daar, op advies van "experts" (anoniem natuurlijk) gewoon in mee: security.nl/posting/876914.

Hoe NAÏEF kunnen we zijn?!

En waarom een EV-certificaat, bijv. van de Rabobank, 1FA (en DV nauwelijks veiliger dan DNS is - een notoir onveilig protocol): security.nl/posting/877247.

P.S. Helaas heb ik Bert Hubert moeten bliokken nadat hij IDF-propagandaspam uit Auschwitz had geboost.

#Availability #Beschikbaarheid #Cinfidentiality #Vertrouwelijkheid #Integrity #Integriteit #Authenticity #Authenticiteit #Risico #Economie #Cloudflare #Fastly #CDN #AitM #MitM.#FISASection702 #FISA #ThreeLetterAgencies#Trump #Sbowden #E2EE #InfoSec #VVD #PVV #CIDI #VT #VirusTotal #DVCerts #DV #OV #EV #QWAC #CyberCrime #NepWebsites #FakeWebsites